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Summary
“Never change a winning team” is a well-known heuristic that recommends not altering the
composition of successful teams. Using game-level observations of the highest German soccer
league over a period of seven seasons, we find that the number of changes in the starting line-up
is significantly lower after wins than after losses, taking suspensions and unobserved team
heterogeneity into account. We show that teams of coaches who follow the heuristic do
not win significantly more often, and that coaches significantly decrease the number of changes
in the starting line-up even after wins caused by the exogenous home field advantage. These
results provide first suggestive evidence that coaches may be influenced by behavioural con-
cerns when following the heuristic to not change winning teams.
1 Introduction
This paper uses the team sports industry to examine the well-known heuristic “never
change a winning team” that recommends not altering the composition of successful
teams. Selecting players for the starting line-up is a complex and risky decision, because
it is uncertain which combination of players is most likely to succeed. Given this uncer-
tainty, coaches are likely to be susceptible to heuristics. After testing the existence of the
“never change a winning team” heuristic, we analyse the effectiveness of this heuristic. In
particular, we test if successful teams that change their composition win less often in the
subsequent game than successful teams whose composition remains unchanged, control-
ling for potential confounders. In addition, we test if coaches adjust the team composi-
tion even to exogenous performance shocks that are unrelated to the unobserved quality
of the teamwork.
We investigate the “never change a winning team” heuristic employing game-level data
of the highest German soccer league, Bundesliga, over a period of seven seasons
(n=4032). Using field data from the team sports industry is advantageous for exploring
the “never change a winning team” heuristic for four reasons: First, doing research in the
team sports industry imitates laboratory research, as hypotheses can be tested in a con-
trolled but yet natural field environment with real efforts and high financial incentives.
* We are grateful to two anonymous referees and the participants of the Workshop of Commission of
Organization 2010 in Berlin for helpful comments. We thank Hannes Ullrich for sharing the injury
data. Earlier versions of the paper circulated under the titles “Regret Aversion on the Field” and
“Why Coaches Do Not Change Winning Teams”.
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All teams are governed by standardized rules of competition that eliminate factors that
would otherwise substantially increase complexity and reduce the power of our study.
Second, winning games by scoring more goals than the opposition team is an objective
measure of team effectiveness. Third, panel data is easily available due to the frequency
and regularity of league games (Kahn 2000). Fourth, the well-established home field ad-
vantage (e. g., Courneya/Carron 1992; Nevill et al. 1996; Carmichael/Thomas 2005) cre-
ates exogenous team performance shocks that can be used to examine behavioural ex-
planations of the “never change a winning team” heuristic. One reason for the home field
advantage is referee favouritism. Several studies show that referees tend to favour home
teams in decisions concerning stoppage time, critical goals and penalties (e. g., Garicano
et al. 2003; Sutter/Kocher 2004; Dohmen 2008). This implies that the same combination
of players may win the home game and lose the away game, even though they collabo-
rated equally well in both games. Thus, from a sporting perspective, coaches should not
react to performance variations caused by the home field advantage.
This paper shows that the number of changes in the starting line-up between two con-
secutive games is significantly lower after wins than after losses, controlling for suspen-
sions and unobserved team heterogeneity. To analyse the reasons for such behaviour, we
perform two tests: Firstly, we show that teams of coaches who follow the “never change a
winning team” heuristic are not more likely to win the next game, ceteris paribus, than
teams of coaches who do not follow the heuristic. Secondly, we find evidence that coa-
ches significantly decrease the number of changes in the starting line-up after wins even
when we use the home field advantage as instrument of the previous team success. The
home field advantage creates performance variations that we argue to be unrelated to the
unobserved quality of teamwork. Thus, our results provide first suggestive evidence that
coaches may be influenced by behavioural concerns when following the heuristic to not
change winning teams. The psychological scenario study of Zeelenberg et al. (2002)
shows that behaving according to the “never change a winning team” heuristic decreases
regret, irrespective of the team performance. Herding (Banjeree 1992; Bikhchandani et
al. 1992) and social pressure (Akerlof 1980; Bernheim 1994) may be other behavioural
reasons why coaches follow the “never change a winning team” heuristic.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a short introduction
to the theoretical background of the “never change a winning team” heuristic. Section 3
describes the data and the empirical models and presents the results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical background of the “never change a winning team” heuristic
Do teams benefit from not changing a winning team or is the heuristic just a behavioural
artefact that has no effect on, or even compromises, future team performance? The fol-
lowing two sections present two competing – but not mutually exclusive – types of ex-
planations: a sporting explanation and behavioural explanations.
The sporting explanation of the “never change a winning team” heuristic is simple: Win-
ning serves as an indicator that a particular combination of fielded players functions
well. Losing instead signals that the players do not fit well together. The team’s previous
performance reveals aspects of the otherwise unobserved quality of a team combination.
Consequently, “never change a winning team” helps to increase (future) team perfor-
mance.
Alternatively, the “never change a winning team” heuristic can be explained by beha-
vioural reasons. Coaches could be guided by expected emotions associated with the
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team performance and the way it is achieved when not changing a winning team. Given
the high uncertainty in which combinations of players are most likely to succeed, the
coaches are likely to be susceptible to emotions. The psychological scenario study of
Zeelenberg et al. (2002) explains the “never change a winning team” heuristic by regret
aversion: Student participants considered that if the soccer team had won the previous
game, a soccer coach who persisted with the same starting line-up would feel less regret
than a coach whomade changes, although both teams likewise lose the next game. Herd-
ing behaviour (Banjeree 1992; Bikhchandani et al. 1992) and social pressure (Akerlof
1980; Bernheim 1994) could be alternative behavioural explanations to not change win-
ning teams. If coaches are guided by behavioural reasons for following the “never change
a winning team” heuristic, they should even react to previous wins caused by exogenous
factors that are unrelated to the unobserved quality of teamwork.
3 Empirical framework
This paper analyses the decision of the coach on the number of changes in the starting
line-up between two consecutive games. Soccer teams compete in one 90-minute game
per week. Seventy-five minutes before a game begins, the coach has to announce the
eleven players in the starting line-up. As the rules of the game in soccer – unlike in other
team sports, such as basketball or ice hockey – restrict the maximum number of substi-
tutions during the game to three, selecting the starting line-up is an important strategic
decision.
3.1 Data
Our data consist of game-level observations of all teams appearing in the highest German
soccer league, the Bundesliga, during the seven seasons beginning with the 1999/00 sea-
son and lasting until the 2005/06 season. As the Bundesliga consists of 18 teams playing
each other twice during the season, the full season includes 306 games, generating 612
team observations. Since European soccer clubs can change their roster twice a year,
namely in the summer and winter breaks, we exclude the first game after each break.1
Thus, 576 team-game observations per season and 4032 observations in total remain.
3.2 Dependent variable and descriptive statistics
To construct the dependent variable, we first calculated the raw number of replacements
in a team’s starting line-up between two consecutive games in the national league. We
neglected changes among the substitutes, as the actual score of the game may influence
which and howmany players the coach replaces during a game. Teams that are ahead not
only substitute more than teams that are behind (Franck/Nu¨esch 2010), they are also
more likely to make risk-reducing substitutions by replacing offensive players with de-
fensive ones (Grund/Gu¨rtler 2005). By analysing the changes in the starting line-up, we
can exclude such influences. Because replacements due to suspensions are beyond the
coach’s range of influence, we adjusted the raw number of replacements in the starting
line-up for suspensions.
1 Since the transfer period lasted until the fourth game after the summer and winter breaks in some
seasons, we also estimated models in which we exclude the first four games after the summer and
winter breaks. The results do not change in any significant way, however, when using a more re-
stricted data sample.
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We determined individual suspensions based on game- and player-specific data on red
and yellow cards. The rules of the game in professional German soccer state that a player
is suspended for one game once he has accumulated five yellow cards. If a player receives
a second yellow card during the same game, he is sent off the field for the remainder of the
game and suspended for the next game. After receiving a red card, the player is also sent
off the field and suspended for the next game.2 Our dependent variable, namely the ad-
justed number of replacements in the starting line-up between two consecutive games,
was then calculated by deducting the number of suspensions from the raw number of
replacements in the starting line-up.
In a first step, we start with some basic results. The average number of replacements in
the starting line-up is 1.528 (n=1519) if the team won the previous game and 2.226
(n=2513) otherwise. A mean comparison test rejects the null hypothesis of equal means
at the one percent significance level (t-values=16.7, p50.001). Figure 1 illustrates the
histograms of the number of replacements in the starting line-up depending on the pre-
vious game result.
2 To be precise, a player can be suspended for up to five games in case of severe misbehaviour. We
therefore also tested the results using an alternative specification in which a player who received a
red card is suspended for two games. The main findings did not change in any significant way.
Figure 1 Histograms of the number of replacements in the starting line-up conditional on the
previous game result
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Coaches of German soccer teams change fewer players in the starting line-up after wins
than after losses. However, simple mean comparison tests may be misleading if third
factors affect both the number of changes and the team’s winning likelihood. In the fol-
lowing section we estimate a count data model that controls for time-constant team-spe-
cific factors that may confound the mean comparison.
3.3 Poisson model of the “never change a winning team” heuristic
As our dependent variable, the number of replacements in the starting line-up adjusted
for suspensions, is a non-negative count variable with integer values from 0 to 7, we
apply a count data framework. Standard approaches to analysing counting processes
are the Poisson regression model and the Negative Binomial regression model. Whereas
the Poisson model imposes the assumption that the mean and the variance of the distri-
bution are equal, the Negative Binomial model presumes that the variance of the depen-
dent variable is larger than the mean (Cameron/Trivedi 1998; Winkelmann 2003). We
calculate Poisson regression estimates, because the goodness-of-fit statistics (Chi2=
3579.94, p-value=1.00) do not reject the assumption of equality of mean and variance
of the dependent variable.3
The main explanatory variable is a dummy variable Winit1 coded 1 if team i won the
previous game (0 otherwise). The estimates of a simple model in which the number of
replacements is only explained byWinit1 may be spurious, because confounders such as
the team’s talent disparity are likely to correlate with both Winit1 and the dependent
variable. Franck and Nu¨esch (2010) show that teams with a balanced talent pool per-
form worse than teams with higher talent heterogeneity, controlling for the average ta-
lent level. A balanced talent pool, in turn, is likely to increase the “turnover” in the start-
ing line-up. We therefore include seasonal-team fixed effects as controls to take account
of the season-constant heterogeneity between teams. Whereas squad composition
changes considerably across seasons, it remains rather stable within each season.4
We also experimented with a proxy for game-specific injuries as additional control va-
riable, but it did not change our results in any significant way.5 As the injury proxy is only
available for a subsample of games, we exclude it in the main specification to maximise
the size of the data sample.
The coefficients in Table 1 are estimated via (quasi) maximum likelihood. The standard
errors in parentheses areWhite-heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the coach level
to take potential serial correlation of the error term into account. Table 1 shows that
coaches decrease the number of replacements by 39.8% if the team succeeded in the
previous game, controlling for unobserved team heterogeneity. The Poisson model con-
firms that coaches change significantly fewer players of the starting line-up after wins
3 However, a Negative Binomial regression would lead to virtually the same results.
4 Between 1995/96 and 2006/07 less than 10% of all players in the highest German soccer league
changed teams within a season (Franck/Nu¨esch 2010).
5 We tried to proxy the number of injured players at a given point of time using the information of
Comunio.de, an online soccer simulation game. Before each game, the operators of Comunio.de
classify all players under contract to a German club as either fit, rehabilitating, weakened, or in-
jured, based on public information and private club enquires. Using this data source, we find that
the number of players of a given team who lost or received the status “injured” does not correlate
with the dependent variable (coefficient -0.03, p-value 0.27). The injury proxy is only available for
the seasons 2003/04 to 2005/06.
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than after losses. We do not know so far, however, why coaches behave accordingly. The
following two sections are dedicated to this purpose.
3.4 “Never change a winning team” and subsequent performance
If the “never change a winning team” heuristic is based on sporting reasons, following
the heuristic should increase subsequent winning. To test this prediction, we estimate
three different Logit models with the likelihood of winning (Winit) as dependent
variable. The first model includes games if the previous game was won, the second model
includes games if the previous game was lost, and the third model includes all games
independent of the previous game result. For the first two models the sample size
reduces from 4032 to 1519.
Our main explanatory variable is the Number of replacementsit- 1. In the third model
that contains all games we additionally include a dummy variable Winit1 coded 1 if
team i won the previous game (0 otherwise) and an interaction term of Number of re-
placementsit1 and Winit1. The sporting explanation of the “never change a winning
team” heuristic predicts a negative effect of Number of replacementsit1 on the
likelihood of winning in model 1 (if the previous game was won) but not in model 2
(if the previous game was lost). In model 3 the coefficient of the interaction term is
expected to be significantly negative under the sporting explanation.
To control for the influence of relative team quality, we include a dummy variable de-
noting home teams and a probability measure of winning based on game-specific book-
maker odds. For each possible game outcome (i. e., home win, draw, away win) the of-
ficial German bookmaker Oddset publishes decimal odds (e. g., 2.0) that represent the
payout ratios for a winning bet. The higher the odds, the less likely this event is expected
to occur. We transformed the decimal odds into “probability odds”, defined by the re-
ciprocal of the decimal odds (1/2.0=0.5). The sum of the “probability odds” of all three
game outcomes usually exceeds 1 due to the bookmaker’s margin. We therefore adjusted
the odds by the bookmaker’s margin with the result that the adjusted probability odds
sum up to one as required for a probability measure.Oddset announces the betting odds
every Tuesday morning, i. e., four to five days before the game. The odds incorporate
information on the general playing quality of both competing teams and other available
and game-relevant information such as home game status and injuries of important
players. Potential performance-related information based on a team’s line-up and the
number of replacements should not be incorporated in the odds, however, because
the line-up is usually kept secret until 75 minutes before the game.
Table 1 Test of the “never chance a winning team” heuristic
Winit-1 -0.398***
(0.032)
Seasonal-team fixed effects yes
Log pseudolikelihood -6372.9
Number of observations 4032
Notes: Quasi-Maximum Likelihood estimates of a Poisson model with the
number of replacements in the starting line-up between two consecutive
games (adjusted for suspensions) as dependent variable. The standard errors
(in parentheses) are White-heteroskedasticity robust and adjusted for serial
correlation at the coach level. Significance levels: *10%, **5%; ***1%.
252 . Stephan Nu¨esch and Hartmut Haas
Table 2 illustrates the marginal effects of the Logit models of winning and in parentheses
the White-heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for serial correlation at the
coach level. Table 2 shows that neither the number of replacements in the starting line-up
in the first column nor the interaction term in the third column affect the likelihood of
winning.6 Thus, our data does not support the sporting justification for not changing a
winning team. Teams of coaches who follow the “never change a winning team” heur-
istic are not more likely to win the next game, ceteris paribus.
The estimation results of the control variables reveal that winning a game is strongly
associated with the probability odds that the corresponding team will win, whereas
the home game dummy has no additional explanatory power. The latter finding does
not prove that the home field advantage is inexistent (the contrary will be shown latter
in the paper) but simply that the home field advantage is fully incorporated into the
betting odds.
The fact that following the “never change a winning team” heuristic does not affect sub-
sequent team performance provides first suggestive evidence that the coaches may be
guided by non-sporting behavioural reasons when selecting the starting line-up. In
the next section we aim to readdress the question whether the coaches’ adherence to
“never change a winning team” may have behavioural reasons by using the home field
advantage as a source of performance variations that we argue to be unrelated to the
unobserved quality of teamwork.
6 As the size and the statistical significance of the interaction effect are conditional on the explanatory
variables in non-linear Logit models (Ai/Norton 2003), we employed the user-written Stata com-
mand inteff (Norton et al. 2004) that calculates the marginal effects over the whole range of ex-
planatory variables to test the sensitivity of the results. The coefficient of the interaction effect varies
between 0.007 (p=0.82) and 0.021 (p=0.19).
Table 2 “Never chance a winning team” and subsequent team performance
If team won the
previous game
If team lost the
previous game
All games
Number of replacementsit-1 0.005 -0.009 -0.013
(0.013) (0.010) (0.008)
Winit-1 -0.053
(0.027)
Number of replacementsit-1*Winit-1 0.019
(0.015)
Home gameit -0.033 0.045 0.009
(0.025) (0.023) (0.015)
Probability odds of a winit 1.417 *** 1.391 *** 1.373 ***
(0.115) (0.138) (0.066)
Log pseudolikelihood -895.30 -900.97 -2508.87
Observations 1519 1519 4032
Notes: The table illustrates the marginal effects of a Logit model with Winit (0/1) as dependent variable. The
White-heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for serial correlation at the coach level are reported in
parentheses. The results react insensitively to alternative estimation procedures like Probit or the linear probability
model (LPM). Significance levels: *10%, **5%; ***1%.
Empirical Evidence on the “Never Change a Winning Team” Heuristic . 253
3.5 Exogenous team performance variations and coach behaviour
In the previous section we found that following the “never change a winning team” heur-
istic does not improve subsequent team performance, ceteris paribus. Thus, the data does
not support the sporting explanation. To reexamine the behavioural reasons of the
“never change a winning team” heuristic, we need team performance variations that
are unrelated to the unobserved quality of teamwork. In professional soccer, the
home field advantage serves as a source of performance variations that we argue to
be orthogonal to the unobserved quality of teamwork.
The existence of a home advantage is well-established: teams playing in home stadiums
win significantly more often than chance would dictate (Courneya/Carron 1992; Nevill
et al. 1996; Carmichael/Thomas 2005). There are four explanations why home teams are
more likely to win at home than away: Firstly, the large crowd – mostly supporting the
home team – stimulates the home team players and intimidates the players from the op-
posing team (Carmichael/Thomas 2005). Secondly, referees tend to favour the home
team when deciding on the amount of stoppage time in close games and in disputable
decisions to award goals and penalty kicks (Garicano et al. 2003; Sutter/Kocher 2004;
Dohmen 2008). Thirdly, the home team is familiar with the stadium and the playing area.
Fourthly, visiting teams experience greater fatigue due to travelling (Carmichael/Thomas
2005).
We regard the first two explanations as major factors and the latter two as minor factors.
As all teams play each other in one home and one away game in a randommanner, but in
such a way that home and away games alternate,7 the incidence of playing in the home
stadium creates team performance variations that we argue to be uncorrelated with the
playing strength of the fielded players and the quality of teamwork. The coach’s decision
on the number of changes in the starting line-up does not affect travelling fatigue and
familiarity effects and is very unlikely to influence referee favouritism. We cannot ex-
clude the possibility that psychological crowd effects are related to “never change a win-
ning team”. However, this would rather prove social pressure than sporting reasons as
behavioural explanation why coaches do not change winning teams.
Table 3 illustrates the results when using the dummy variableHomeGameit-1, equalling 1
if the previous game was a home game and 0 otherwise, as instrument for the previous
team success. The first column shows the estimates of the first-stage equation with
Winit1 as dependent variable, whereas the second column shows the estimates of the
second-stage equation explaining the number of replacements in the starting line-up
with the predicted values of Winit1 as explanatory variable. In the second-stage equa-
tion, we use a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator of an instrumental
variable Poisson model implemented by Nichols (2007).8 The standard errors are esti-
mated by the asymptotic approximation, as outlined by Hansen (1982). To take account
of the season-constant heterogeneity between teams, we include seasonal-team fixed ef-
fects as controls.
The estimates of the first column (first-stage equation) in Table 3 show that playing in the
home stadium significantly increases the winning probability by 23.2%. The partial R2
7 Very occasionally, a team plays two games in a row at home or away, for example, if a game is
postponed due to unfavourable weather conditions.
8 Specifically, IV-Poisson is implemented using the “ivpois” command in Stata 11 written by Nichols
(Nichols 2007).
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of 6.3% and the high F-statistics (261.08) of the identifying instrument Home Gameit-1
document the relevance of our instrument when explainingWinit1 (Bound et al. 1995).
The estimates of the second column in Table 3 show that coaches significantly decrease
the number of replacements by 21.3% after wins even though the previous success was
caused only by the home field advantage.
4 Conclusions
Using game-level observations of the highest German soccer league over a period of seven
seasons, we find clear empirical evidence of the “never change a winning team” heuristic:
soccer coaches change significantly fewer players in the starting line-up after wins than
after losses, controlling for suspensions and unobserved team heterogeneity.
We show that following the “never change a winning team” heuristic does not improve
subsequent team performance and that coaches adapt their player selection for the start-
ing line-up even to performance variations due to exogenous home field factors, such as
referee favouritism. These results provide first suggestive evidence that behavioural
rather than sporting concerns may influence the coach’s adherence to “never change
a winning team”. Our findings are in line with evidence from psychological scenario
studies using stated preferences, which show that behaving according to heuristics de-
creases regret even when holding the decision outcome constant (Inman/Zeelenberg
2002; Zeelenberg et al. 2002).
An aspect that we have not yet addressed is the strategy of squad rotation. Some coaches
use squad rotation as a matter of routing to create internal competition for the line-ups
and to rest players. Squad rotation generally increases “turnover” of the competing
team, i. e. regardless of whether the team lost or won the previous game. Whether squad
rotation benefits or harms team performance is controversial. But even if squad rotation
affected team performance, the seasonal-team fixed effects in our model would largely
absorb this potential confounding effect. Squad rotation, therefore, does not distort our
results.
Table 3 IV-Poisson model using the home game advantage as instrument
Winit-1 Number of
replacementsit
Home gameit-1 -0.232 ***
(0.014)
Predicted Winit-1 -0.213 *
(0.111)
Seasonal-team fixed effects yes yes
Partial R2 of Home gameit-1 0.063
F-statistics of Home gameit-1 261.08 ***
Observations 4032 4032
Notes: The first column of this table illustrates the coefficients of a multivariate linear probability model (LPM) with
Winit-1 as dependent variable (first stage). The second column presents the IV-Poisson estimates (second stage)
using the algorithm of Nichols (2007). Winit-1 is instrumented by the dummy variable Home gameit-1. The standard
errors (in parentheses) are derived with bootstrap methods in the second column. Significance levels: *10%, **5%;
***1%.
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Our study does not control for the influence of performances in (i) the German Cup, (ii)
the Europa League and (iii) the Champions League. Because coaches tend to rest their
(star) players in the national club games scheduled shortly before the international com-
petitions, clubs playing in international competitions should have a higher”turnover”. In
addition, the team selection of coaches may react less sensitively to previous results in
the national league if the team also plays in international club competitions. Additional
sensitivity tests (see Table A1 in the Appendix) reveal that the negative effect of previous
wins on the number of replacements is smaller but still statistically significant for teams
playing in international tournaments.
As stated preferences are unavailable, this paper is not able to discriminate between the
different behavioural explanations for the heuristic. In addition to revealed preferences
approaches using field data, we encourage future survey studies to identify the exact
attitudes and emotions that motivate coaches to follow the “never change a winning
team” heuristic.
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